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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to §63-
46b-16, Utah Code Annotated and Rule 45 Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section 24: 
"All Laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation." 
14th Amendment, United States Constitution: 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Mr. Merrill asserts that the coordination of benefits clause of the Workers' 
Compensation Act, § 34A-2-413(5), violates Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Art. I, Section 24 of the Utah 
State Constitution. Questions relating to the constitutionality of a statute are 
questions of law reviewed under a correction of error standard. Mountain Fuel 
Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 752 P.2d 884, 887 (Utah 1988). However, 
statutes are presumed constitutional, and the court will "resolve any reasonable 
1 
doubts in favor of constitutionality." Ryan v. Gold Cross Services. Inc.. 903 P.2d 
423, 424 (Utah 1995). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Workers' compensation, social security disability and retirement, and 
unemployment compensation benefit systems are all intended to provide income 
replacement to those who have suffered wage loss due to physical disability, 
economic unemployment or old age. 
Utah's workers' compensation system was created to provide statutory 
benefits to employees who have been injured at work. Fault is not a factor in 
workers' compensation, but the statute is liberally construed to provide broad 
coverage. However, in exchange for such broad coverage, the benefits available 
are limited only to the benefits provided by statute. 
Section 413(5) is one such limitation, it provides an offset of workers' 
compensation permanent total disability compensation based on one-half of the 
social security retirement benefit received by the employee. Mr. Merrill claims that 
this offset is unconstitutional and violates older workers' rights to equal protection 
of the laws. However, Mr. Merrill does not have a constitutional right to receive 
more than one wage replacement benefit. Mr. Merrill receives social security 
retirement benefits and workers' compensation permanent total disability benefits. 
The purpose of these two types of benefits is to replace wages that he is no 
longer able to earn due to age and disability. 
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The reverse offset in § 413(5) is intended to prevent the employer from 
paying twice for the same wage loss and prevent receipt of duplicate benefits by 
injured workers. Mr. Merrill's employers have paid one-half of the insurance 
premium for Mr. Merrill's social security retirement benefit, in addition, his last 
employer is paying workers' compensation benefits. The offset in §413(5) works 
to avoid duplicate payments from multiple sources for one wage loss. This helps 
to control the cost of workers' compensation premiums and prevents duplicate 
payments for a single wage loss. Because the coordination of benefits provision 
in §413(5) is rationally related to legitimate state purposes, the statute does not 
violate state or federal equal protection provisions. 
ARGUMENT 
Mr. Merrill asserts that Section 413(5) treats him differently from other 
permanently and totally disabled injured workers, those under age 65 who do not 
receive social security retirement benefits. Clearly, Section 413(5) treats 
permanently and totally disabled injured workers who qualify for social security 
retirement benefits differently from those who do no so qualify. However, for the 
reasons outlined below, §413(5) is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose 
and therefore, does not violate the equal protection provisions of Art. 1, § 24 of 
the Utah Constitution or the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. 
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Age is not a suspect class subject to strict scrutiny under Utah's test of 
constitutionality. Purdv v. University of Utah. 584 P.2d 831 (Utah 1978) (Age is 
not an inherently suspect classification), and the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution). The federal courts have likewise held that age is not 
a suspect class. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murqia. 427 U.S. 307 
(1976). In Murqia the Court observed, that "older persons, again, unlike those 
who suffer discrimination on the basis of race or gender, have not been subjected 
to a 'history of purposeful unequal treatment.'" ]d- at 313. "Old age also does not 
define a discrete and insular minority because all persons, if they live out their 
normal life spans, will experience it." id- at 313-314. Therefore, legislative acts 
which discriminate based upon age are reviewed under a rational basis test. 
The test under federal law is whether the state action is rationally related to 
a legitimate state interest. "States may discriminate on the basis of age without 
offending the Fourteenth Amendment if the age classification in question is 
rationally related to a legitimate state interest. The rationality commanded by the 
Equal Protection Clause does not require States to match age distinctions and 
the legitimate interests they serve with razorlike precision. Rather, a state may 
rely on age as a proxy for other qualities, abilities, or characteristics that are 
relevant to the State's legitimate interests. That age proves to be an inadequate 
proxy in any individual case is irrelevant" Kimel et al. v. Florida Bd. of Regents, et 
ai, 528 U.S.62, 83 (2000). 
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Workers' compensation is economic legislation to provide subsistence 
benefits to employees injured at work. See A. Larson & Lex K. Larson., 
LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW §1.03 (2007). Receipt of workers' 
compensation benefits is not a fundamental right under federal law and rights 
related to these benefits are reviewed under a rational basis test. In re Tobin. 
675 N.E. 2d 781, 784 (Mass. 1997). Utah courts, have similarly applied a 
rational basis test to economic legislative acts. Baker v. Matheson. 607 P.2d 233 
(Utah 1979). Although the construction of the Utah Constitution is "not controlled 
by the federal courts' construction and application of the Equal Protection 
Clause," such case law "may be persuasive in applying Article 1, § 24." Malan v. 
Lewis. 693 P.2d 661, 670 (Utah 1984). Article I, § 24 and the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution "embody the same general 
principle: persons similarly situated should be treated similarly, and persons in 
different circumstances should not be treated as if their circumstances were the 
same." Malan v. Lewis. 693 P.2d 661, 669 (Utah 1984). 
Whether a statute meets equal protection standards 
depends in the first instance upon the objectives of the 
statute and whether the classifications established 
provide a reasonable basis for promoting those 
objectives... Art. I, § 24 protects against two types of 
discrimination. First, a law must apply equally to all 
persons within a class. (Citations omitted.) Second, the 
statutory classifications and the different treatment given 
the classes must be based on differences that have a 
reasonable tendency to further the objectives of the 
statute. (Citations omitted.) If the relationship of the 
5 
classification to the statutory objectives is unreasonable 
or fanciful, the discrimination is unreasonable. 
id. at 670. 
The legislation at issue in this case is § 413(5) of Utah's Workers' 
Compensation Act. This section provides in relevant part: 
Notwithstanding the minimum rate established in 
Subsection (2), the compensation payable by the 
employer, its insurance carrier, or the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund, after an employee has received 
compensation from the employer or employer's 
insurance carrier for any combination of disabilities 
amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at the 
applicable permanent total disability compensation rate, 
shall be reduced, to the extent allowable by law, by the 
dollar amount of 50% of the Social Security Retirement 
benefits received by the employee during the same 
period. 
Utah Code, § 34A-2-413(5). 
Whether § 413(5) of the Workers' Compensation Act is constitutional or not 
necessarily turns on whether the statutory classification which limits benefits 
available to a specific group of recipients, is rationally related to a legitimate 
purpose of the statute. The Utah Supreme Court has identified several basic 
purposes for Utah's Workers Compensation Act: 
The Workers' Compensation Act ("WCA") "is meant to provide an 
alternative remedy to employees injured or killed in the course and scope of their 
employment. In the absence of the WCA, an injured employee's only remedy 
would be a civil action brought against the tortfeasor-an inherently uncertain 
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means of recovery. The WCA guarantees a minimum level of compensation in 
exchange for which the injured party is required to abide by its terms." Anderson 
v. United Parcel Service. 96 P.3d 903, 910 (Utah 2004). 
Our Compensation Act is a beneficent law, passed to 
protect employees and those dependent upon them; to 
indemnify certain persons because workmen cease to 
earn wages, and to provide workmen's dependents with 
something in substitution for what they lost by the 
workmen's death. The clear intention of the Legislature 
was 'to substitute a more humanitarian and economical 
system of compensation for injured workmen or their 
dependents in case of their death,' which the more 
humane and moral conception of our time requires. The 
Act affords, through administrative bodies, injured 
industrial workmen or their dependents simple, 
adequate and speedy means of securing compensation, 
to the end that "the cost of human wreckage may be 
taxed against the industry which employs it, which tax or 
burden is added to the price of the produce and is 
ultimately paid by the consumer. Thus the Legislature 
sought to promote the public welfare by relieving society 
of the support of unfortunate victims of industrial 
accidents, and to avoid the necessity of the employee's 
dependents becoming objects of public charity... The 
law is predicated on the police power inherent in every 
sovereignty-the power to legislate and to govern for the 
best interests of the state. 
Park Utah Consolidated Mines Co. v. Industrial Comm'n. 84 Utah 481, 36 P.2d 
979,981 (1934) (Internal citations omitted). 
Workmen's compensation acts are not intended to fully 
compensate and employee for his loss of time and 
diminished earnings both past and future, nor to 
compensate him for the pain and suffering incident to 
the injury. The common law action is based on some 
wrongful act of commission or omission on the part of 
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the employer, and the employee assumes all the risks of 
injury except such as arise out of the negligence of the 
employer, while under the workmen's compensation 
acts the employee assumes no risks whatever, and 
hence his compensation in case of injury is based upon 
some arbitrary statutory regulations.... Those 
regulations are found in the statutes and are intended to 
prevent injustice to the employer, the employee, and to 
the public which must ultimately bear a large share of 
the burdens which are incident to our industrial 
activities. 
Broderick v. Industrial Comm'n. 63 Utah 210, 224 P. 876 (Utah 1924). 
Thus, our Workers' Compensation Act provides more certain, but limited, 
benefits to employees than those available under tort law. The predictability 
created by our compensation system allows employers to pay a sum certain for 
the loss sustained by the employee1. Clearly, predictability, reproducibility and 
ease of administration were important legislative considerations in the statutory 
creation of benefits under the Act. 
1
 The Workers' Compensation Act provides easily reproducible methods for 
calculating wage loss benefits based on the maximum weekly rates specified for 
each type of compensation or wage loss benefit. For example, maximum weekly 
rates are based on a percentage of the "state average weekly wage," pursuant to 
Section 34A-2-410(3). All compensation benefits that may be awarded under the 
Act are tied to the wages an injured worker was earning "at the time of the injury." 
Utah Code Section 34A-2-410(1); Uintah Power & Light Co. v. Industrial Comm'n. 
189 P. 875,876 (Utah 1920). Temporary wage loss benefits are paid for periods the 
employee is unable to work until the date of medical stability or the statutory 312 
week limit for these benefits is reached. See Booms v. Rapp Construction Co.. 720 
P.2d 1363,1366 (Utah 1986). Permanent Partial Disability compensation is based 
on a percentage of bodily impairment multiplied by a period of 312 weeks. See Utah 
Code §34A-2-411. 
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The system provides an efficient mechanism for an injured worker to file a 
claim and receive benefits for wage loss, medical treatment and loss of earning 
capacity (permanent disability compensation) without the need to sue in tort and 
prove the employer was negligent. The employer is responsible for payment of 
benefits for injuries that occur at work even if the employee was grossly negligent 
and caused the accident and injury. This liability for injured workers is spread 
among the consumers of the goods and services provided. Because the Act is 
intended to provide compensation when workmen "cease to earn wages," the 
benefit structure under the Act is directly tied to the injured worker's weekly 
wage2. 
Utah's permanent total disability "PTD" statute pays up to 85% of the state 
average weekly wage for permanently disabled injured workers. PTD benefits 
are paid for life, even though an injured worker could reasonably be expected to 
retire from the workforce at some point. Section 413(5) provides that upon receipt 
of social security retirement benefits, workers' compensation benefits will be 
reduced by 50% of the injured worker's social security retirement benefit. 
2
 All compensation benefits in the act are based upon 66% percent of the 
employee's average weekly wage up to a statutory maximum based on the state 
average weekly wage. Section 34A-2-409. The statutory maximums are different for 
each type of disability payment: temporary total and temporary partial disability may 
be as high as 100% of the state average weekly wage under Sections 34A-2-
410(1)(a) and 34A-2-411(1). Permanent partial disability, however is limited to a 
maximum rate of 66% of the state average weekly wage under Sections 34A-2-
412(3). Permanent total disability compensation is limited to no more than 85% of 
the state average weekly wage under Section 34A-2-413(2)(a). 
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"Retirement" is defined as "1 a: an act of 1. retiring: the state of being retired, b: 
withdrawal from one's position or occupation or from active working life c: the age 
at which one normally retires." Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionarv/retirement. "The purpose of the 
federal old age benefits of the Social Security Act is to provide funds through 
contributions by employer and employee for the decent support of elderly 
workmen who have ceased to labor." Social Security Bd. V. Nierotko. 327 U.S. 
358,364(1946). 
Given that workers' compensation benefits under the statute are intended 
to provide limited replacement for the loss of earning capacity caused by an 
industrial injury, the reduction of such compensation upon retirement from the 
workforce makes sense. The employer does not continue to pay full wage 
replacement benefits to the injured worker after he has withdrawn from active 
working life. As financial planners regularly remind us, retirement from the 
workforce typically results in reduced income, particularly income received for 
work performed. § 413(5) therefore, reduces the workers' compensation 
component of the injured workers' income based on the assumption that other 
wage replacement income is available to the injured worker upon receipt of social 
security retirement benefits. See A. Larson & Lex K. Larson, LARSON'S WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION LAW § 157.01 (2007). 
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Although the legislature could have elected to take similar offsets against 
privately funded pensions and other sources of retirement income, the mere lack 
of an offset against other sources of non-age-based retirement income does not 
make the offset imposed irrational. Rather, the Connecticut Supreme Court 
observed that receipt of non-aged based pension benefits does not necessarily 
equate to retirement from the workforce. The Court noted, "[l]t was rational for 
the Legislature not to apply the offset to those benefits if its goal was to reduce 
payment of wage replacement benefits for retired workers." Rayhall v. Akim Co.. 
Inc., 263 Conn. 328, 353 (2003). Utah's reduction of permanent total disability 
benefits is based on the portion of the Social Security premium paid by the 
employer, and therefore, reduces the monthly workers' compensation payment 
by that amount. The limitations of all benefits, including permanent total disability 
benefits, under Utah's Workers' Compensation Act serves to reduce the costs of 
insurance for Utah employers. 
Connecticut, Washington and Kentucky courts have concluded that a 
workers' compensation offset of permanent total disability benefits based on a 
percentage of the social security retirement benefit satisfies the rational basis 
test. Rayhall v. Akim Company. Inc.. 263 Conn. 328 (2003) (Reverse offset 
applied to recipients of Social Security retirement benefits based on presumption 
the worker is retired from the workforce is rationally related to legitimate state 
purpose of cost saving); Harris v. Labor & Industry. 843 P.2d 1056 (WA 1993) 
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(Reverse offset applied to Social Security retirement benefits rationally related to 
legitimate purpose of avoiding duplicate payments of wage loss benefits); Wynn 
v. Ibold. 969 S.W.2d 695 (KY 1998) ("Tier down" provision that requires 10% 
reduction of permanent total benefits each year from age 65 to age 70 is 
rationally related to the legitimate state purposes of avoiding duplication of 
income benefits and reducing the overall cost of maintaining the workers' 
compensation system.) The Kentucky Supreme Court subsequently concluded 
that the Freedom to Work Act of 2000 did not change the constitutional analysis 
articulated in Wynn. McDowell v. Jackson Energy RECC. 84 S.W.3d 71 (KY 
2002) (Freedom to Work Act does not create a right for social security retirement 
recipient to receive unearned income such as workers' compensation total 
disability benefits). 
Mr. Merrill cites several cases to stand for the proposition that there is no 
duplication of benefits when a disabled worker is receiving Social Security 
retirement benefits and permanent total disability benefits because the two 
benefits do not serve the same purpose. However, the usefulness of the cases 
he cites are limited to their specific facts. Pierce v. LaFourche Parish Council. 
762 So.2d 608 (LA 2000) addresses a benefit limitation different than the reverse 
offset contained in Utah's §413(5). The statute at issue in Pierce established a 
maximum supplemental disability benefit period of 104 weeks for workers over 
age 62. Injured workers under age 62 were entitled to a maximum of 520 weeks 
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of the same type of benefit. The Court concluded that this scheme was different 
from a true coordination of benefit arrangement. The Court noted, "The issue of 
whether it is constitutional under an equal protection analysis to reduce workers' 
compensation benefits under La. R.S. 23:1225(C)(1)(b) if the employee is also 
receiving social security old age benefits is not before us in this case." Id. at fn. 5. 
It appears that the supplemental earnings provision under La. R.S. § 1221 is the 
equivalent of Utah's temporary partial disability provision. Louisiana's permanent 
total disability compensation reverse offsets enumerated in § 1225 are similar to 
those at issue herein. 
In Boan v. Richardson. 198 W.Va. 545 (1996), the West Virginia Supreme 
Court of Appeals agreed that the state purposes of preserving the fiscal integrity 
of the state workers' compensation system and avoiding duplication of benefits 
were legitimate governmental concerns. However, the Court stated that the 
benefits available under the workers' compensation act were "in lieu of such 
elements of damage in the common law tort system as lost wages, lost earning 
capacity, reimbursement of past and future medical expenses, past and present 
pain and suffering, emotional distress, and other factors." ]d. at 548. The Court 
reasoned that social security retirement benefits, on the other hand, are 
retirement benefits earned by continuation in the work force and the attainment of 
the age of 62 or 65. The Court concluded that because totally disabled workers' 
compensation claimants over 65 were treated differently from partially disabled 
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workers over 65, the statute treated similarly situated individuals differently, jd- at 
553. Finally, the Court concluded that the classification of "old age social security 
recipient" was not rationally related to the governmental purpose of avoiding 
duplication of benefits and concluded that "as a result, all persons within the class 
of 'old age social security recipients' were not treated equally." 
Importantly, the Boan Court concluded that workers' compensation benefits 
were intended to replace in full the many elements of damages that are available 
to tort plaintiffs from tort feasors. Utah courts have never held that the statutory 
benefits available under workers' compensation are intended to substitute for all 
of the damages potentially available to a plaintiff in a tort lawsuit. See Park Utah 
Consol. Mines and Broderick. supra. 
Rather, workers' compensation benefits are a statutory creation that are 
not based on fault. Professor Larson states the level of benefits is "based on a 
compromise between actual loss of earning capacity and arbitrary presumptions 
of the amount needed for support." Larson, §1.04[3]. The Boan Court failed to 
appreciate the distinction between damages available in tort and compensation 
available through workers' compensation programs. "A compensation system, 
unlike a tort recovery, does not pretend to restore to the claimant what he or she 
has lost; it gives claimant a sum which, added to his or her remaining earning 
capacity, if any, will presumably enable claimant to exist without being a burden 
to others." Larson, §1.03[5]. 
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Workers compensation benefits are not intended to represent and cannot 
reasonably be construed as a substitution for damages for pain, suffering and 
emotional distress, because those damages are simply unavailable in a typical 
workers' compensation system. "In compensation, unlike tort, the only injuries 
compensated for are those which either actually or presumptively produce 
disability and thereby presumably affect earning power. For this reason, some 
classes of injuries which result in verdicts of thousands of dollars at common law 
produce no award whatsoever under a compensation statute." Larson, §1.03[4]. 
Although Utah's statute restricts Mr, Merrill's right to sue his employer in 
tort, tort law would require him to prove employer negligence and fault before he 
would be entitled to any compensation for his loss. An example of the limitations 
inherent in using tort law to provide for injured workers, is the case of a railroad 
worker who injured his hand while coupling cars in employment outside our 
workers' compensation system. Benefits under tort were denied because the 
railroad cars were not defective, and Mr. Raymond knew it was extremely 
dangerous to put his hand in a position where a slight forward shifting of the load 
could and did injure his hand. Raymond v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.. 191 P.2d 
137 (Utah 1948). 
The workers' compensation system was created to remedy a situation 
where injured workers were not able to receive any compensation for their 
injuries in the workplace because they could not prove the necessary elements 
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under the common law. Employers faced the uncertain financial impact of 
defending negligence suits filed by injured workers or their dependents. The 
legislature recognized that proving negligence and collecting damages is not a 
sure thing, and that the expense and uncertainty of the tort system placed 
burdens on business and the local economy as well as injured workers. To 
remedy these perceived problems, the legislature adopted a no-fault, statutory 
system of benefits to serve employers and employees. However, the statutory 
scheme provides only limited benefits in exchange for no fault coverage. 
For all of these reasons, the analysis offered by the Boan Court is not applicable 
to the constitutional analysis of Utah's reverse offset statute. 
It is interesting to note that the West Virginia Legislature responded to the 
Boan decision by amending the workers' compensation statute to terminate all 
permanent total disability benefits at age 653. The West Virginia Supreme Court 
of Appeals reviewed the constitutionality of the new statutory provision in State ex 
rel. Beirne v. Smith. 214 W.Va. 771 (2003). The West Virginia Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the amended statute, observing that, despite its remedial 
nature and purpose, the benefits available under the state workers' compensation 
system are defined and limited by the statute. The Court noted it was the role of 
the Legislature to balance the compensation available to injured workers against 
3
 W.Va. Code § 23-4-6(d) (1995). 
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the need to maintain the fiscal integrity of the workers' compensation insurance 
providers. 
The Colorado Supreme Court held that state's statute denying permanent 
total disability but allowing permanent partial disability compensation benefits to 
injured workers over 65 unconstitutional because the statute treated permanent 
and totally disabled injured workers over 65 differently from partially disabled 
workers over age 65. The reasons given for those statutory limitations were to 
prevent duplication of wage replacement benefits, allow a cost of living increase 
for other workers' compensation recipients, and reduce costs. Industrial Claims 
Appeals Office v. Romero. 912 P.2d 62 (CO 1996). Again, the Colorado benefit 
scheme that was held unconstitutional is different from Utah's reverse offset 
provision. 
The Wyoming decision cited by Mr. Merrill, Reesor v. Montana State Fund. 
2004 MT 370 (MT 2004) (No rational basis to deny permanent partial disability 
compensation to a class of injured workers based on their age), similarly 
addresses statutory provisions related to permanent partial disability benefits, 
dissimilar to the provisions of the Utah statute at issue herein. 
Petitioner cites Sasso v. Ram Property Management. 431 So.2d 204 (FL 
1st DCA 1983); affd Sasso v. Ram Property Management. 452 So.2d 932 (FL 
1984), to support his claim that avoiding duplication of benefits by is not rationally 
related to the purpose of the workers' compensation statute, id. at 218. However, 
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the Florida Court ultimately concluded that reducing employer payments of 
employment related fringe benefits; attempting to offer increased job 
opportunities to younger workers; creating incentives for older workers to retire by 
providing decreased disability coverage; and reducing the costs of premiums 
were all rationally related to the purposes of the workers' compensation statute. 
The Court ultimately concluded that the Florida provision in question did not 
offend the equal protection clause. 
Utah's reverse offset provision, taken as part of the entire scheme of 
workers' compensation benefits provided under the statute, attempts to balance 
the interests of workers, business and the general public. The statute provides 
limited benefits to compensate an injured worker for medical expenses and wage 
loss, including any permanent impairment of earning capacity, that results from 
an industrial injury. These basic benefits are available upon a showing that the 
injury arose out of and in the course of employment and was medically and 
legally caused or aggravated by the employment. 
The Utah statute attempts to balance the need to pay continuing wage 
replacement benefits to older injured workers' who are considered to be retired, 
with the need to control the cost of workers' compensation benefits and 
premiums. Utah workers are not subject to a harsh offset that eliminates benefits 
entirely upon reaching "retirement age," as in some jurisdictions. The employer 
does not pay for duplicate disability and retirement wage replacement benefits 
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once the injured worker reaches the age that he is considered retired from the 
workforce. Rather, the Utah Legislature chose to coordinate the workers' 
compensation benefit with the social security retirement benefit. The injured 
worker continues to receive social security retirement benefits pursuant to federal 
law, but the employer is entitled to reduce the workers compensation benefits 
paid, arguably in exchange for the social security taxes paid by the injured 
worker's employers. Thus, Utah's reverse offset avoids duplication of benefits for 
a single wage loss. 
It was rational for the Utah Legislature to conclude that receipt of Social 
Security Retirement benefits establishes a presumption that the injured worker is 
retired from the workforce. It is was also rational for the legislature to reduce 
wage replacement benefits available to PTD recipients on the date he is 
considered under the Act to be retired from the workforce to help control costs 
and avoid duplication of benefits. 
The coordination of benefits or reverse offset contained in §413(5) helps to 
provide a fiscally sound system and helps to control the cost of workers' 
compensation premiums. The general public benefits from a competitive 
economy that attracts new employers to the state and avoids creating a 
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competitive disadvantage for Utah employers in relation to employers located in 
other states4. 
Mr. Merrill argues that although social security will allow him to earn 
unlimited wages and receive undiminished social security retirement benefits, he 
can no longer work to earn additional wages because of his disability. However, 
Mr. Merrill's receipt of permanent total disability compensation does not mean 
that he can no longer work at all. §34A-2-413(7) allows permanent total disability 
recipients to work to supplement their income up to $500 per month, if he is 
physically capable and chooses to do so. In addition, an award of permanent 
total disability compensation, in and of itself, does not mean an injured worker 
cannot work at any job. Rather, an award of permanent total disability reflects 
that the employee cannot perform the particular job or class of jobs that he was 
capable of performing on the date of the accident, and earn a similar wage. It is 
not uncommon for an injured worker to qualify for permanent total disability 
compensation because available employment options available to him after the 
accident pay a lower wage than his wage on the date of injury. See LPI Services 
v. Labor Commission. 2007 UT App 375 (Commission rule that establishes 
4
 "Observe that this question of the theoretical impact of compensation liability on 
the individual employer is an entirely different matter from the question of whether the 
relative generosity of compensation in a particular jurisdiction subjects the industry of an 
entire state to a competitive disadvantage. For example, when Wisconsin began to 
compensate for silicosis before its neighbors did, its granite and monument works had to 
shutdown. . ." Larson, § 1.03fn. 19. 
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specific wage thresholds to determine whether "other work reasonably available," 
is not an abuse of agency discretion.) 
Utah's statutory workers' compensation scheme reduces uncertainty, 
simplifies administration of claims, and controls the cost of the system. This 
benefits employers and employees. Employees and employers benefit from the 
ability to predict and calculate benefits based on the statutory formulae. The 
statutory limits on available benefits, regulation of medical expenses, and ability 
to predict benefits with some certainty keeps the cost of insurance premiums low, 
which encourages job growth and business relocation into our state. Employees 
benefit from the liberal construction of the statutory provisions which bring as 
system, but the trade off for such generous coverage is limited benefits. The 
legislature made a number of policy choices to define a basic set of benefits to 
prevent impoverishment of employees who are injuied on fhe job Although Ihe 
costs of the system are spread among the consumers of products and services, 
there is not an infinite amount of money available to finance this system. 
Although the balance reached by the legislature may not be perfect for specific 
employees and employers in a given situation, overall, it functions as designed. 
It is the role of the legislature to balance the interests of the affected parties 
and make the policy decisions regarding the extent of coverage available under 
our workers' compensation system. In regard to §413(5), the legislature most 
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likely concluded that injured workers' who receive social security retirement 
benefits have another source of wage replacement income and adopted the 
reverse offset to avoid duplication of benefits paid by the employer that are 
intended to cover the same wage loss. Professor Larson notes: 
Wage loss legislation is designed to restore to the worker a portion, 
such as one-half to two-thirds, of wages lost due to the three major 
causes of wage-loss: physical disability, economic unemployment, 
and old age. The crucial operative fact is that of wage loss; the 
cause of the wage loss merely dictates the category of legislation 
applicable. Now if a workman undergoes a period of wage loss due 
to all three conditions, it does not follow that he or she should receive 
three sets of benefits simultaneously and thereby recover more than 
his or her actual wage. The worker is experiencing only one wage 
loss and, in any logical system, should receive only one wage-loss 
benefit. 
Larson, §157.01 (2007). 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, the limitation of benefits under §413(5) helps to 
control costs and avoid duplication of wage loss payments for a single wage loss. 
It helps to preserve a system of benefits for injured workers which are limited, but 
relatively easy to obtain. Accordingly, §413(5) is rationally related to these 
legitimate purposes and is constitutional. This Court should affirm the decision of 
the Court of Appeals in this matter. 
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